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MORE THAN JUST A COOL T-SHIRT: WHAT
WE DON'T KNOW ABOUT COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING-BUT SHOULD-TO MAKE

ORGANIZING EFFECTIVE
Ellen Dannin*& GangaramSingh **

ABSTRACT

Union organizing is much in the news these days as legislation to

facilitate unionization wends its way through Congress.1 However, it
takes more than organizing to organize unions and to maintain
organization. Workers do not join unions just to be members or to get
cool t-shirts and sing "Solidarity Forever." Workers join unions because
they want what unions can get them-better pay, just cause employment,

respect, and a say in workplace conditions.2 Organizing alone cannot
get these things. Organizing is only a vehicle that leads to the collective

bargaining power that wins workplace rights.
As Samuel Gompers said in 1925, "[e]conomic betterment-today,
tomorrow, in home and shop, was the foundation upon which trade

unions have been buil[t]. ' 3 Through collective bargaining, workers can
earn more money, have greater job security, exercise greater control over

* Fannie Weiss Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State
University-Dickinson School of Law. B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., University of
Michigan.
** Professor and Chair, Department of Management, College of Business Administration, San
Diego State University. Ph.D., Industrial Relations, University of Toronto; M.I.R., Industrial
Relations, University of Toronto; M.B.A., Business Administration, University of Toronto;
B.Comm., Business Administration, University of Windsor.
1. See Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007) (as passed by the
House in a 241-185 vote, March 1, 2007), available at www.govtrak.us/congress/bill.xpd?
bill=hI 10-800.
2. Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a Cause
for Labor's Decline, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 145-46 (1998).
3. SAMUEL GOMPERS, SEVENTY YEARS OF LIFE AND LABOR: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 94 (Nick
Salvatore ed., ILR Press 1984) (1925).
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their jobs, and create a community that supports one another.4 The
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 5 itself recognizes organizing and
joining unions as important because they lead to collective bargaining
and create the power necessary to secure improved wages and working
conditions and promote economic security.6 A plummeting union
membership rate raises serious concerns as to how well unions can7 do at
bargaining and thus creates weaker incentives to belong to unions.
Unfortunately, in many cases collective bargaining leads nowhere
except to impasse, de-unionization, and replacement of unionized
workers with unorganized workers. 8
Judicial tinkering is partly
responsible for these results, and thus for the decline in union
membership. 9 Judges have created doctrines that have made reaching
bargaining impasses-rather than reaching negotiated agreements-and
provoking strikes-rather than resolving disputes-attractive to
employers.10 Law reform could be used to legislatively repeal these
judicial amendments, but, unfortunately, these critical doctrines and their
impact have received little attention from the researchers who could
engage in the empirical research necessary to law reform. Even worse,
some research has been premised on misunderstandings of legal doctrine

4. Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 223, 253-54 (2005) [hereinafter Dannin, NLRA Values].
5. §§ 1-19,29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
6. See id. at § 1. For a discussion of NLRA policies see generally ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING
BACK THE WORKERS' LAW-How TO FIGHT THE ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS 51-79 (2006);
Dannin, NLRA Values, supra note 4.
7. The decline has prompted many to propose reforms. See Ellen J. Dannin & Terry H.
Wagar, Lawless Law? The Subversion ofthe National Labor Relations Act, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
197, 197-98 (2000) [hereinafter Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law] (discussing the declining numbers
in private union membership); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 106-07, 111 (1990) (discussing further obstacles presented by
employers, many of whom are resistant to collective bargaining initiatives).
8. Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7, at 202.
9. Id. at 198. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, private sector union membership
has continued to decline:
In 2006, 12.0 percent of employed wage and salary workers were union members, down
from 12.5 percent a year earlier, the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor
Statistics reported today. The number of persons belonging to a union fell by 326,000 in
2006 to 15.4 million. The union membership rate has steadily declined from 20.1
percent in 1983, the first year for which comparable union data are available ....
The
union membership rate for government workers (36.2 percent) was substantially higher
than for private industry workers (7.4 percent).
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY: UNION
MEMBERS IN 2006 (2007), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 22-46.
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and, thus, is of little value. 1
If union organizing is to be successful, collective bargaining must
be a useful tool for empowering workers. This article outlines a menu of
research projects that, taken together, lay out a comprehensive social
science research agenda for understanding how collective bargaining is
faring today. It also advances theories about how these factors may be
affecting collective bargaining, and describes methodologies that would
be appropriate for research across a wide range of law and social science
disciplines.

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1935, Congress concluded that wage deflation threatened the
stability of the country, that the cause of wage deflation was inequality
of bargaining power between employers and employees, and that
corporation law had caused this inequality.' 2 According to Congress,
corporation law transformed employers from individuals into
amalgamations with collective power, while leaving employees with
only the power of individuals. 13 Congress decided that it needed to
create an equal and opposing collective entity to rectify the imbalance of
bargaining power that the law created 4 and, therefore, enacted the
NLRA. 15
Section 1 of the Act states all this explicitly.16 It observes that real
negotiation is impossible when law gives the employer power so great
that the employee, who lacks this legal support and power, cannot
bargain as an equal. 7 The result of this inequality, Congress stated, had
been, and would continue to be, a ratcheting down of wages and working8
conditions, devastating competition, and the destruction of commerce.'
The NLRA's antidote was to protect workers' rights to freedom of
association, self-organization, free choice of bargaining representatives,
and meaningful collective bargaining, in order to safeguard the
economy. 19

11.
12.

See infra text accompanying notes 97, 106-07.
National Labor Relations Act § 1,29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).

13.

Id.

14.

Id.

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. §§ 1-19.
Id.§l.
Id.
Id.

19.

Id. The NLRA defines the duty to bargain collectively as the "mutual obligation of the

employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
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The enactment of the NLRA was not the end of the story.
Amendments in 1947 and 1959 were condemned by labor. 20 Less
noticed, but equally important, have been judicial decisions that have
effectively amended the NLRA to take away the rights of employees to
engage in self-organization, free choice of bargaining representatives,
and meaningful collective bargaining." It is no exaggeration to say that
the judiciary's actions have the potential to reset the NLRA's balance
power in favor of employers, and to undermine the policies Congress
established in the NLRA.
The breadth of revision by the least
democratic branch of government and the implications of this process
have been insufficiently examined. Achieving the balance of power
Congress intended to achieve in the NLRA requires a broad research
agenda. The goal of that research agenda must be to fully assemble the
state of the laws, to track the forces that led to the law as now applied,
and to identify methods of bargaining power restraining unions.
This article lays the groundwork for a comprehensive research
agenda to be used to understand how collective bargaining under the
NLRA is faring today. One use for the research would be as part of a
litigation strategy to overturn the judicial amendments that have
radically reshaped the NLRA. This article first identifies the key legal
doctrines that have undermined collective bargaining by recalibrating the
balance of bargaining power set by the NLRA. It then describes issues
related to collective bargaining as to which we lack information,
research methods that can be used to gather that information, and any
special research challenges.

faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation
of an agreement .
I..."
ld. § 8(d); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union
Avoidance: Misunderstanding the National Labor Relations Act, 71 TEX. L. REv. 921, 973-76

(1993) (discussing Congress' objective to curb employer conduct and to promote employee clout in
collective bargaining, which, in turn, promotes general economic health).
20. The Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (2000), more commonly
referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act, was enacted in 1947. The Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2000), more commonly referred to as the Landrum-Griffin

Act, was enacted in 1959. Taft-Hartley's enemies call it the "Slave-Labor" Act. See THE CENTURY
FOUND., REPORT OF THE CENTURY FOUNDATION TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF UNIONS: WHAT'S

NEXT FOR ORGANIZED LABOR? 75 (1999); see also Shannon Sheppard, Pamphlets in the Fight
Against

Taft-Hartley

1947-1948,

HOLT

LABOR

LIBRARY,

Dec.

20,

2002,

http://www.holtlaborlibrary.org/tafthartley.html (demonstrating organized labor's disdain for the
Taft-Hartley Act).
21.

Ellen Dannin, From DictatorGame to Ultimatum Game... and Back Again: The Judicial

Impasse Amendments, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 241, 243-44 (2004) [hereinafter Dannin, Dictator
Game].
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II. JUDICIAL DOCTRINES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FAILURE
Two doctrines, developed by judges, have had a powerful impact
on collective bargaining. 22 The first doctrine, striker replacement, 23 is
dramatic, and its impact is easy to see and understand.24 In its most
basic form, when workers strike, their employer may replace them with
other workers, either permanently (that is, during and after the strike) or
temporarily (that is, during the strike only), depending on the cause of
the strike.25 If the strike was motivated by economics, for example, to
persuade the employer to accept the union's bargaining proposal on
wages, the employer may either permanently or temporarily replace the
strikers.26 However, if the strike was caused by the employer's unfair
27
labor practice, the employer may only hire temporary replacements.
Permanent replacement seems almost indistinguishable from discharge
for striking.2 8
It is obvious that workers will not want to be permanently replaced,
and that threat of permanent replacement will make workers hesitant to
strike.2 9 As a result of this judicial change, employees have less power
to persuade their employers to accept their proposals. Furthermore, this
doctrine conflicts with the plain language and policies of the NLRA.3 °
Among the NLRA policies are creating equality of bargaining power and
promoting the practice and procedure of collective bargaining to
determine the terms and conditions of employment.3 1 In section 13, the
NLRA states that the Act is not to "be construed so as either to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike." 32 In addition,
under the NLRA, an employer violates the law when it discriminates

22. Id. at 267.
23. James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103
MICH. L. REV. 518, 527 (2004).
24. See id. at 527-34.
25. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 356-69 (Higgins et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006); see also
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938) (holding that during an economic
strike, employers may permanently replace striking employees).
26. See Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345.
27. See COMM. ON THE DEV. OF THE LAW UNDER THE NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra

note 24, at 1472-73.
28. See Pope, supra note 23, at 527 (citing National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), (3), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (2000); Eileen Silverstein, If You Can't Beat 'em, Learn to Lose, but Never
Join Them, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1371, 1373 (1998)).
29. See id. at 528-29.
30. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1)(3); Pope, supra note 23, at 527.
31. National Labor Relations Act § 1.
32. Id. § 13.
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against an employee who supports a union, or when it "interferes with,
restrains or coerces" an employee who engages in collective bargaining
or "other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining" or
to support other employees.33
From our own experience, it is less obvious that only long after the
workers have been replaced is it definitively determined whether a strike
was an economic or unfair labor practice strike. If unfair labor practice
strikers are permanently replaced, their employers will begin to owe
them back pay from the dates of the employees' unconditional offers to
return to work.34 This can be such a large sum that an employer could
risk bankruptcy if it makes the wrong decision. These risks may be so
great that employers may exercise restraint when deciding whether to
permanently replace strikers.
The second judicial doctrine, implementation upon impasse, allows
an employer to impose terms from its "final offer" when the parties have
reached an impasse in bargaining. 35 The impact of this doctrine is not as
obviously dramatic as striker replacement, nor is its ramifications as
easily grasped. Oddly enough, for a doctrine that has been in existence
since the 1940s, 36 it is virtually unknown to the field of industrial
relations-now the study of human resources management. In fact,
several years ago we conducted an informal survey by questioning
industrial relations scholars and found that many of the scholars had not
heard of the doctrine, nor did their texts mention it. Most scholars
taught that when an impasse was reached in collective bargaining,
employers and unions were required to go to mediation to resolve the
impasse. 37 One of the prominent scholars we asked during our informal
33. Id. §§ 7, 8(a)(1), (3).
34. E.g., Chesapeake Plywood, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 89-2981, 1990 WL 162514, at *4, *6 (4th
Cir. Oct. 26, 1990); Trinity Valley Iron & Steel Co. v. NLRB, 410 F.2d 1161, 1170-71 (5th Cit.

1969).
35.

COMM. ON THE DEV. OF THE LAW UNDER THE NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note

24, at 918-19; Ellen J. Dannin, Collective Bargaining,Impasse and the Implementation of Final
Offers: Have We Created a Right Unaccompanied by Fulfillment?, 19 U. TOL. L. REv. 41, 43-44
(1987) [hereinafter Dannin, Collective Bargaining]; see also Eric Tucker, "Great Expectations"
Defeated?: the Trajectory of Collective BargainingRegimes in Canadaand the United States PostNAFTA, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 97, 142 (2004) (discussing various indicators suggesting that

unionized employers in the United States are using collective bargaining as a vehicle for extracting
employee concessions); Ellen J. Dannin, Legislative Intent and Impasse Resolution Under the
National Labor Relations Act: Does Law Matter? 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 11,12-14 (1997)
[hereinafter Dannin, Legislative Intent] (discussing judicial adoption of the "final offers" doctrine

upon reaching of an impasse, and the resulting inequality of bargaining power between employers
and employees).
36. Dannin & Wagar, Collective Bargaining,supra note 37, at 44.
37. Ellen J. Dannin & Clive Gilson, Getting to Impasse: Negotiations Under the National
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survey said that he was aware of the doctrine, but claimed that it was
very rarely used. Ironically, this statement took place at a time when
high-profile labor disputes were in the news. 38 Follow-up queries
through the years show that little has changed in what is taught in this
field. 39 This lack of awareness may explain why there has been little
empirical research on implementation upon impasse.40
Another reason may be that it is less dramatic, and its impact on
collective bargaining and unionization is a bit harder to envision. It
appears, though, that the employer's ability to implement the terms it
wants creates an incentive for the employer to try to reach an impasse in
bargaining, and for the union to try to avoid an impasse. 41 Logically
speaking, the easiest way for an employer to get to an impasse is to
demand terms it knows will be unacceptable to the union. Just as with
striker replacement, implementation upon impasse conflicts with basic
NLRA 2policies that are intended to promote equality of bargaining
4
power.
Third, the striker replacement and implementation upon impasse
doctrines interact with one another, and, when applied together, they
appear to have a far more powerful impact on collective bargaining than
Labor Relations Act and the Employment ContractsAct, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 917, 925
(1996).
38. Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7, at 199-200; see also Dannin, Legislative
Intent, supra note 37, at 13-14 (discussing how this oversight is difficult to comprehend considering
that the doctrine played an important role in "some of the most protracted and almost irresolvable
labor conflicts of recent years .... ").
39. As an example, Richard Block and his co-authors recount an incident in which an
employer implemented its final offer and replaced all strikers, but then failed to discuss the role the
employer's power to implement played in events which weakened the union. RICHARD N. BLOCK
ET AL., LABOR LAW, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND EMPLOYEE CHOICE: THE STATE OF THE
WORKPLACE IN THE 1990S 88-92 (1996). But see MICHAEL D. YATES, WHY UNIONS MATTER 69-

71 (1998) (discussing implementation of the employer's last offer upon impasse); MICHAEL YATES,
POWER ON THE JOB: THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF WORKING PEOPLE 121-26 (1994) (discussing collective

bargaining and explicitly mentioning the doctrine of implementation upon impasse); Adrienne
Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Collective Bargaining in the Paper Industry: Developments Since 1979, in
CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 25, 44-49 (Paula B. Voos ed.
1994) (discussing the United Paperworkers International Union's efforts with respect to bargaining
and specifically mentioning unilateral implementation of a final offer under strong opposition by the
union).
40. In fact, research on striker replacement seems to have fallen off as well, perhaps as a
result of the current focus on organizing. See Gangaram Singh & Ellen Dannin, Creating a Law
Reform Laboratory:EmpiricalResearch and Labor Law Reform, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1,3 (2005).
41. Gangaram Singh & Ellen Dannin, The Shadow of the Law: Impasse Laws at Odds with
the NLRA, 53 LAB. L.J. 179, 186 (2002).
42. ELLEN DANNiN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS' LAW-HOW TO FIGHT THE ASSAULT ON
LABOR RIGHTS 7-8, 31-32, 86-96, 114-15, 150-52 (2006); Dannin, Dictator Game, supranote 21, at

267.
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either would alone. 43 Both doctrines play a role in connection with
impasses. Strikes can occur at any time, except during the term of an
agreement not to strike, unless the strike arises in opposition to an unfair
labor practice committed by an employer.44 However, strikes are most
likely to occur when there is an impasse in bargaining as a way to
persuade the employer to agree to the union's demands.4 5 Such a strike
is an economic strike, and the employer has the right to permanently
replace strikers.46
When a bona fide impasse is reached, the employer has the right to
implement its final offer.4 7 If the employer implements this offer before
there is a bona fide impasse, the employer's implementation is an unfair
labor practice. 48 The existence of unfair labor practices, including
prematurely implementing a final offer, means that a strike may be an
unfair labor practice strike to protest the employer's unfair labor
practices, rather than an economic strike.49 If the employer implements
its final offer prematurely or illegally, it can be found guilty of an unfair
labor practice and will have to remedy the violation.5 ° If the employer
guesses wrong about replacing strikers, it may
have to reinstate the
51
strikers and will owe back pay until it does so.
Whether the employer replaces strikers or implements its final offer
will depend, in part, on how confident it is that there is a bona fide
impasse and that the strike is not an unfair labor practice.5 2 Unions, for
their part, also have uncertainty, because they will try to cast a strike as
caused by an employer's unfair labor practice so that strikers cannot
legally be permanently replaced.53 In short, the two doctrines are more
intimately related to one another than merely taking place at the same
stage of bargaining.

43.
44.
45.
46.

Dannin, DictatorGame, supra note 21, at 267-70.
See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 1597-98.
See Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7, at 216.
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 1591-92, 1598.

47. Id. at 988-89.
48. Id. at 996.
49.
50.
51.

Dannin, Collective Bargaining,supra note 37, at 61.
See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 996-97.
Craig Becker, "Better Than a Strike": Protecting New Forms of Collective Work

Stoppages Under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 351,416 (1994); Michael D.
Moberly, Striking Bargains: the At-Will Employment of Permanent Strike Replacements, 18

HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 167, 179 (2000).
52. See Peter Guyon Earle, Note, The Impasse Doctrine, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 427
(1988); Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL.

L. REv. 547, 566 (1990).
53. See Moberly, supra note 52, at 181-82.
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These doctrines-implementation upon impasse and striker
replacement-are likely to occur in tandem because both are connected
with reaching a bargaining impasse.54 Not only are they connected in
time, but they can also be connected as part of a strategy or series of
events that lead to de-unionization and the total defeat of the purposes of
the NLRA.55 Indeed, Human Rights Watch included both striker
replacement and unilateral implementation upon impasse as factors that
led it to conclude that United States labor law violates international
56
human rights standards.
It is easier to see the connection between implementation upon
impasse and striker replacement by considering examples of possible
outcomes these two doctrines can produce:
(1) the parties reach an agreement; (2) the parties reach an impasse but
eventually resolve their differences; (3) the parties reach an impasse,
the employer implements its final offer, and the parties then reach an
agreement; (4) the parties reach an impasse, the employer implements
its final offer, the parties then fail to reach an agreement, and the union
becomes moribund leading to de-unionization--either by its walking
away or through decertification; (5) the parties reach an impasse, the
workers strike, the employer replaces the strikers (permanently or
temporarily), the parties reach an agreement on workplace terms and
on striker reinstatement, and many or all strikers are recalled to work;
(6) the parties reach an impasse, the workers strike, the employer
replaces the strikers (permanently or temporarily), the parties reach an
agreement on workplace terms and on striker reinstatement, few or no
strikers are recalled to work, and the union eventually becomes
moribund and is decertified; (7) the parties reach an impasse, the
workers strike, the employer replaces the strikers permanently, and
after one year, when they are ineligible to vote, a decertification
election is held and the union is decertified; (8) the parties reach an
impasse, the employer locks out the workers and then replaces them
(permanently or temporarily), the parties reach an agreement on
workplace terms and on reinstatement, and many or all the employees
are recalled to work; (9) the parties reach an impasse, the employer
locks out and replaces the workers (permanently or temporarily), the
parties reach an agreement on workplace terms and on reinstatement,

54. Dannin, Dictator Game, supra note 21, at 267.
55.

Id.

56. See

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS'
FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 59-60

(2000) (citing NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962)).
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few or no employees are recalled to57work, and the union eventually
becomes moribund and is decertified.

Of the two doctrines, striker replacement and implementation upon
impasse, the latter has been far less explored,58 so that is where we focus
the research agenda discussed here. However, it must be borne in mind
that striker replacement and implementation upon impasse have long
been inextricably intertwined, so research on implementation upon
impasse will tend to shed light on strikes and striker replacement.
Each of these doctrines appears to undermine worker bargaining
power and, thus, to make unions less effective in protecting workers and
57. Dannin, DictatorGame, supra note 21, at 267-68 (citation omitted). In a previous article,
I discuss Michael H. LeRoy's analysis of how employers aim to manipulate the amended NLRA §
9(c)(3) to preclude strikers from voting in union decertification elections. Id. at 267 n.1 15. t also
note that unions respond to this attempted manipulation by "having strikers file RD petitions to
decertify the union so that the election would be held at a time when the strikers would be eligible to
vote, thus preserving the union's right to represent the unit for one more year." Id. See also Peter
Bruce, On the Status of Workers' Rights to Organize in the United States and Canada, in
RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 273, 274 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994)

(discussing the Caterpillar strike of 1992 and how it was brought to an abrupt end by the employer's
threat to replace striking workers). In recent years, judicial decisions have limited reinstatement
rights for strikers, "render[ing] the right to reinstatement virtually meaningless in many cases."
Douglas E. Ray, Some Overlooked Aspects of the Strike Replacement Issue, 41 KAN. L. REv. 363,
382 (1992).
58. See, e.g., Peter Cramton & Joseph Tracy, The Use of Replacement Workers in Union
ContractNegotiations: The U.S. Experience, 1980-1989, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 667 (1998) (addressing
only the use of replacement workers, and not the implementation upon impasse doctrine); Cynthia
L. Gramm & John F. Schnell, Some Empirical Effects of Using Striker Replacements, 12
CONTEMPT. ECON. POL'Y 122, 122 (1994) (analyzing the effects of using permanent replacement
workers on the employer's ability to maintain operations, the effect these replacements have on
strikers, and the influence of using such workers on the bargaining process, but failing to mention
the doctrine of implementation upon impasse); John F. Schnell & Cynthia Gramm, The Empirical
Relations Between Employers' Striker Replacement Strategies and Strike Duration, 47 INDuS. &
LAB. REL. REv. 189 (1994) (discussing striker replacement, without acknowledging implementation
upon impasse); see also LAWRENCE M. AUSUBEL ET AL., BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION
(2000),
http://www.ausubel.com/bargaining-papers/acd-handbook-chapter.pdf
(applying economic theory to the collective bargaining process and mentioning the hiring of
replacement workers, but not mentioning implementation upon impasse); Prohibiting
DiscriminationAgainst Economic Strikers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources, 103rd Cong. 6-8 (1993) (statement of Robert B. Reich, Secretary
of Labor, on labor-management relations, the importance of the right to strike, and the practice of
workers
for strikers),
available at http://www.dol.gov/oasam/
hiring replacement
programs/history/reich/congress/033094rr.htm. In fact, when implementation upon impasse has
been studied by non-lawyers, the doctrine has been badly misunderstood. The result is research that
has no bearing on the reality of collective bargaining. A recent example is Jesse A. Schwartz &
Quan Wen, Wage Bargaining Under the National Labor Relations Act, 15 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 1017 (2006). The authors there engage in an elaborate econometric analysis of the
impact of an employer's engaging in unilateral implementation of a raise, but do not adequately
address the full range of rights judges have given employers once an impasse is reached.
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improving their lives. If this intuition is correct, then union efforts to
organize workers and retain collective bargaining will be undermined.
Research into the effects of the two doctrines could be used to
reform the law, and that reform could take the form of statutory
amendment. However, it will take more than merely proposing new
legislation to recalibrate bargaining power. We say this because of the
history of these two doctrines. Each arose despite the clear language of
the statute. This suggests that powerful forces are at play here, and they
must be addressed in order for law reform to be effective.
As mentioned above, empirical research on these two doctrines
could be used as part of a litigation strategy to overturn the judicial
amendments that have radically reshaped the NLRA. 59 Before laying
out the research agenda we advocate, we first outline how the two
doctrines developed. Understanding how they have developed is as
important as understanding how they function and affect collective
bargaining and the attractiveness of union membership. It is essential to
grasp these two doctrines, for they sprung to life even though they
permit employers to take actions that violate the express language of the
law.
A. The JudicialImpasse Amendments
When it was enacted in 1935, the NLRA rejected master and
servant law. 60 Senator Robert Wagner, the NLRA's drafter, wanted to
convert the master-servant relationship into an equal and co-operative
partnership that planted a sense of power, individuality, freedom, and
security in the hearts of men, and made them the people they were meant
to be.61
Judges, however, have tended to interpret the NLRA, as a very
narrow statute whose purpose is to promote resolving disputes, even
when the resolution means trampling on the rights of freedom of
association and collective bargaining. 62 However, Robert Wagner saw
"the important legislative goals of industrial peace and macro-economic
growth and stabilization" as "always secondary to the achievement of
social justice through democratic consent in the workplace., 63 It was
59. For the details of that strategy, see ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS' LAWHOW TO FIGHT THE ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS (2006).

60. See National Labor Relations Act § 1,29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
61.
62.

75 CONG. REC. 4918 (1932).
See Dannin, DictatorGame, supra note 21, at 243.

63.

Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and
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clear to Wagner that tranquil labor relationships were not the sole
consideration. He observed that, "[i]t all depends upon the basis of
tranquility. The slave system of the old South was as tranquil as a
summer's day, but that is no reason for perpetuating in modern industry
any of the aspects of a master-servant relationship. '" 64
Seventy years after its enactment, judicial interpretations of the
NLRA increasingly undercut its drafters' intent.65 As discussed above,
the two judicially-created doctrines of striker replacement and
implementation upon impasse are fundamentally at odds with the
NLRA's plain language and express policies.66
The right to replace strikers is rooted in dictum from a 1938
Supreme Court decision that was expanded by subsequent decisions.67
This development occurred despite the fact that the NLRA specifically
provided that the right to strike was not to be interfered with, impeded,
or diminished in any way. 68 By the 1980s, striking was no longer a
practical option.6 9
In the case of implementation upon impasse, the NLRA's drafters
decided not to regulate how impasses would be resolved, but, rather, to
leave this to the parties to work out, subject to the pressures of the
market.7 0 It seems surprising, given the NLRA's goal of promoting
collective bargaining, that its drafters decided to leave bargaining almost
unregulated, 71 and decided not to require that the Act's goals of
promoting collective bargaining be met, but this is exactly what they
did.72 Indeed, Congress almost decided not to make bad faith bargaining
an unfair labor practice.73 Rather, Congress hoped that promoting
Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1423 (1993).
64. Id.
65. Seeid. at 1387.
66. See James J. Brudney, Of Labor Law and Dissonance, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1353, 1354-55
(1998) [hereinafter Brudney, Of Labor Law]; Dannin, Collective Bargaining,supra note 37, at 47;
see also Julius Getman, Of Labor Law and Birdsong, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1345, 1349-50 (1998)
(discussing how Mackay Radio paved the way for judicial deviation from policies promulgated by
the NLRA); James J. Brudney et al., JudicialHostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social
Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675 (1999) (study discussing which
social background factors significantly predict judges' likelihoods to side with unions' legal
positions in the courts of appeals).
67. See Pope, supra note 23, at 527-34.
68. National Labor Relations Act § 13 (2000).
69. Pope, supra note 23, at 534.
70. Dannin, Legislative Intent, supra note 37, at 32-33.
71. It was late in the process that bad-faith bargaining was made an unfair labor practice and,
even then, the rights and protections were limited. See S. REP. No. 573, at 2312 (1935).
72. See id.
73. Some today argue that it is not really an unfair labor practice, because the duty to bargain
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worker collectivization alone would be sufficient to give workers true
freedom of contract and the ability to bargain as equals. 74 The NLRA,
thus, has elaborate structures in place to govern the choice of
75
representatives, but none to govern bargaining.
It may be that the NLRA's failure to provide detailed procedures to
control bargaining had no effect on the development of the doctrine of
implementation upon impasse. After all, the NLRA clearly provides, in
section 13, that the right to strike is not to be interfered with, impeded or
diminished in any way, but the Supreme Court ignored this and, within
three years of the NLRA's enactment, it gave employers the right to
permanently replace strikers.76 Just two years later, in 1940, the
groundwork was laid that permitted an employer to unilaterally
implement its terms upon an impasse in bargaining, and within one more
year the fundamentals of the doctrine were established. 77 Until the mid1980s, an employer was permitted to implement its final offer (1) if the
implemented changes were part of the employer's final offer; (2) if the
impasse was bona fide-that is, a real impasse, untainted by any
employer unfair labor practices; and (3) if, and only if, the
implementation was done in such a way that it did not disparage either
the union or the collective bargaining process.78
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the National Labor Relations Board
began chipping away at these safeguards so that it became easy for
employers to reach impasse and, thus, control employment terms
unilaterally.7 9 The Board required less evidence that bargaining had
taken place. 80 It also took a hands-off approach to offers, refusing to

in good faith has become meaningless.
WORKERS'

See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE:

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN

RIGHTS STANDARDS 58-59 (2000). In addition to making little effort to encourage the parties to
consummate an agreement, judicial decisions have also limited the remedy for bad-faith bargaining
to an order to bargain in good faith, rather than imposing monetary sanctions, requiring interest
arbitration, imposing terms, or other effective sanctions that might effectuate the policies of the Act.
See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102.
74. SeeS. REP. No. 573, at2312.

75.

Cf id. (discussing the creation of "refus[ing] to bargain" as an unfair labor practice, the

right of employees to have a representative of their choosing, the procedure of holding a
governmentally supervised election, but not discussing or laying out structures to govern the actual

bargaining).
76.

NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938); Pope, supra note 23, at

527.
77. Dannin, Collective Bargaining, supra note 37, at 44 n. 7 (citing Westchester Newspapers,
Inc., 26 N.L.R.B. 630 (1940); Sam M. Jackson, 34 N.L.R.B. 194 (1941)).

78. Id. at 45-46.
79.
80.

See Pope, supra note 23, at 534; Dannin, Collective Bargaining, supra note 37, at 47-64.
Dannin, Collective Bargaining, supra note 37, at 47 & n.20 (citing E.I. DuPont de
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consider their content as evidence of illegal intent. 8' At this point, any
employer who wanted to reach impasse and implement its final offer
would find it easy to do so.
In the absence of legislation on resolving impasses, the Board and
courts proceeded to fill the statutory gap by developing a complex
structure to control bargaining and the use of employer and union
weapons.82 This judicial interpretation made attention to the legal
impact of party actions an important part of a successful bargaining
strategy.83 For example, in the Detroit Newspaper strike, one attorney
wrote a letter instructing the employer negotiators on how to get to an
impasse and create a record that could be used to prove they were at a
bona fide impasse.8 4 The attorney took the position that implementing
the employer's terms was a right that the union was trying to frustrate,
and that steps needed to be taken to thwart the union from preventing the
exercise of this right:
Because it is unlikely that an acceptable agreement can be reached, we
would like to offer some comments and suggestions concerning
bargaining to an impasse.
We cannot emphasize strongly enough that reaching a lawful
impasse with a union intent upon avoiding that result is difficult,
frustrating, and tedious. Unions in general, and the Guild most
particularly, understand the significance of a legal impasse and have
proven extremely creative in their efforts to deny employers the right
Nemours & Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1076 (1984) ("There need be no undue reluctance to find that
an impasse existed."))
81. in Seattle-FirstNational Bank v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1981), the court
held that inferences drawn from the content of the parties' proposals could not be the sole grounds
for a finding of bad faith. The traditional approach can be seen in cases such as NLRB v. Reed &
Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 139-40 (1st Cir. 1953), vacated, 290 N.L.R.B. 571 (1988) and A-I
King Size Sandwiches, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 850, 858 (1982). Traditionally, the Board held that an
impasse could not be bona fide if caused by an employer's advancing proposals that no selfrespecting union could accept. See Reed, 205 F.2d at 134-35 ("The Board ... must take some
cognizance of the reasonableness of the positions taken by an employer in the course of
bargaining .... [l]fthe employer makes not a single serious proposal meeting the union at least part
way, then certainly the Board 'must be able to conclude that this is at least some evidence of bad
faith, that is, of a desire not to reach an agreement with the union.")
82. See Dannin, Collective Bargaining, supra note 83, at 64-68; see also supra notes 23, 37,
and 45 and accompanying text.
83. Id. at 58-64.
84. Letter from Michael J. Rybicki, attorney with Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson,
to Timothy J. Kelleher, Vice President, Labor Relations, The Detroit Free Press (Apr. 22, 1988) (on
file with author).
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to post conditions....
Although employers sometimes get lucky, all too often it is
necessary to go through what seems to be ridiculous lengths to
establish an impasse. Obviously, the Company needs to proclaim
negotiations are at an impasse and present a final offer to the Guild as
soon as possible. When85you have reviewed this letter, please call so we
can discuss this further.
If bargaining power is defined as the "inducement to agree," 86 then

the law has become part of that inducement. But what is the nature of
this law today? These judicial interpretations have tended to treat union

rights far less favorably than comparable employer rights.87
Striker replacement and implementation upon impasse have long
played a critical role in how collective bargaining is conducted.88 While
striker replacement has received attention from both legal and non-legal
scholars, 89 even today, few studies have been conducted concerning the
incidence or impact of implementation upon impasse, 90 and, so far, no
empirical ones.
This state of affairs might be somewhat comprehensible were
implementation upon impasse is a rare event. However, practitioners in

85. Id.
86. NEIL W. CHAMBERLAIN, A GENERAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC PROCESS 81 (1955).
87. See Brudney, Of Labor Law, supra note 73, at 1353.
88. See Dannin, Dictator Game, supra note 21, at 267.
89. See id. at 249.
90. Also, few law review articles discuss the incidence or impact of implementation upon
impasse. See Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7, at 198-99. For background information
on implementation upon impasse, see generally J. Gilmer Bowman, Jr., An Employer's Unilateral
Action-An Unfair Labor Practice, 9 VAND. L. REV. 487, 500-03 (1956) (outlining the general
purpose and methods of reaching impasse); David G. Esptein, Comment, Impasse in Collective
Bargaining,44 TEX. L. REv. 769 (1966) (arguing that general guidelines for determining when
parties are at an impasse should be outlined); Joseph E. Kolick, Jr. & Merle M. DeLancey, Jr., Can
One UnilaterallyGain the Right to Make UnilateralChanges in Working Conditions? 9 LAB. LAW.
137 (1993) (arguing that giving an employer complete discretion to change working conditions
upon impasse creates an unfair advantage to the employer in post-impasse negotiations); Terrence
H. Murphy, Impasse and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1977)
(reasoning that, when used in good faith, implementation upon impasse can be a valuable tool in
allowing employers to manage their workers); George Schatzki, The Employer's UnilateralAct-A
Per Se Violation-Sometimes, 44 TEX. L. REv. 470, 495-501 (1966) (explaining the impasse
doctrine); Mark Stolzenburg, Note, Blind Faith or Efficiency? The Differences Between the Fifth
Circuitand All Others on the Topic of PrivateSector Impasse Bargaining,80 WASH. U. L. Q. 1341
(2002) (arguing that allowing an employer to make unilateral changes to employment terms and
conditions after notifying the employee representative and allowing for a counterproposal is a better
option than requiring complete impasse).
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the area know it is both common and powerful. 91 It has played a part in
high-profile labor disputes, including disputes at Caterpillar,92 the
Detroit News, 93 the National Football League, 94 the baseball players'
strike, 95 International Paper,96 and Don Lee Distributor, Inc.97 All of
these collective bargaining disputes also involved the issue or threat of
striker replacement.98
To the extent there has been research, it generally confirms the
theory that implementation upon impasse undermines collective
bargaining.9 9 However, the results of those studies were tangential to
their main focuses. 00 This means that the results must be used with
caution. They need to be confirmed, and they need additional research
to produce a robust understanding of the judicial impasse doctrines and
their impact, if any, on collective bargaining. In short, implementation
upon impasse and its connection to striker replacement is every
researcher's dream--issues that matters and that are under-researched.
No case studies and no surveys have been done to examine the
doctrine of implementation upon impasse and its operation alone and in
connection with striker replacement. As a result, we lack basic
information of its incidence, operation, and impact. So far our

91. In fact, "[i]n a study of NLRB cases involving implementation upon impasse, 50% of
employers reached impasse on 'control issues,' that is, terms that allow an employer to control the
workplace as if its employees were not represented by a union." Dannin, Dictator Game, supra
note 21, at 262 (citing Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supranote 7).
92. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 201, 204 (1997).
93. Detroit News, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 262, 263 (1995).
94. Nat'l Football League Mgmt. Council, 309 N.L.R.B. 78, 79 (1992).
95. Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 67 F.3d 1054, 1056,
1058 (2d Cir. 1995).
96. Int'l Paper Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1253 (1995); see also JULIUS GETMAN, THE
BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14 39 (1998).

97. Don Lee Distrib., Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 470, 481 (1996).
98. See Caterpillar, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 201, 209 (1997); Detroit News, 319 N.L.R.B. at 263;
Don Lee Distrib., 322 N.L.R.B. at 486; Nat ' FootballLeague, 309 N.L.R.B. at 79; Int'l Paper Co.,
319 N.L.R.B. at 1253; see also GETMAN, supra note 103, at 36.
99. Kate Bronfenbrenner found that employers engaged in hard bargaining on union security
clauses in 50% of cases, reducing the likelihood of gaining a contract from 92% to 68%; declared
impasse and implemented final offers in 7% of cases, reducing agreement from 82% to 57%; forced
a strike through unacceptable demands in 7% of cases, reducing agreement from 85% to 14%; and
organized a decertification campaign in 14% of cases, with the agreement rate dropping from 88%
to 29%. Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in CertificationElections and First-Contract
Campaigns: Implicationsfor Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR

LAW 75, 85 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994). Another study found implementation in 23% of
negotiations. Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., Collective Bargaining in Small Firms: Preliminary
Evidence of FundamentalChange, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 195, 204-05 (1996).
100. See Bronfenbrenner, supra note 99, at 75-76; Cutcher-Gershenfeld, supra note 99, at 195.
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knowledge of implementation upon impasse and its relationship with
striker replacement is unsystematic and based primarily on theory and

Without fundamental data
the anecdotal experiences of practitioners.'
such as this, we cannot build an informed bargaining theory and lack a
credible basis for rectifying any problems.
B. An Overview of Existing EmpiricalResearch
There has been little empirical research on the impact of
implementation upon impasse alone and as linked with striker
empirical studies have used a variety of
replacement. 10 Existing
2
methodologies.
First, there have been a few surveys that have found data that shows

a statistically significant link between implementation upon impasse and
a failure to achieve first contracts after a union has been organized.'0 3
A second methodology is content analysis. One study examined all
NLRB cases involving the issue of impasse upon implementation in the

context of bargaining for a complete collective bargaining agreement
and all cases involving permanent replacement of strikers for the fifteen
year period from 1980-1994.1 4 This period extended from a few years

101. See Ellen Dannin & Gangaram Singh, The Force of Law on Collective Bargaining:
Empirical Research and Labor Law Reform 4-5 (2002) (unpublished article, on file with author),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=433480.
102. See, e.g., Bronfenbrenner, supra note 99, at 76-77; Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra
note 7, at 205-07.
103. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 99, at 84-86; see also Kate Bronfenbrenner & Tom Juravich,
It Takes More than House Calls: Organizing to Win with a Comprehensive Union-Building
Strategy, in ORGANIZING

TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES

19, 20 (Kate

Bronfenbrenner, et al. eds., 1998) (discussing how Kate Bronfenbrenner's study of certification
elections and first-contract campaigns that occurred in 1986 and 1987 "confirmed the prevalence of
egregious employer behavior in the private sector and the effectiveness of that opposition in
thwarting union efforts to win elections and bargain first contracts"); Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld et
al., How Do Labor and Management View Collective Bargaining?, 121 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 23,
23, 28, 30 (Oct. 1998) (concluding, based on data derived from a national random-sample survey of
union and management negotiators, employer pressure tactics in first contract situations, such as the
use of strike replacement workers, increases the likelihood that no agreement will be reached);
Aided by Consultants, Employers are Blatantly Violating Law, 36 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-3
(Feb. 22, 1985).
104. A full description of the methodology and findings are included in several articles. The
most comprehensive of the articles is Lawless Law. Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7,
at 205-10; see also Ellen J. Dannin & Terry H. Wagar, How True is What Everyone Knows? Board
Avoidance, First Contract and the Organizing Versus Servicing Model, 51 LAB L.J. 3, 5 (2000)
[hereinafter Dannin & Wagar, How True]; Ellen J. Dannin & Terry H. Wagar, Impasse and
Implementation-How to Subvert the National Labor Relations Act, 4 WORKING USA 73 (Fall
2000) [hereinafter Dannin & Wagar, hnpasse and Implementation].
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before the first Reagan appointees through the appointment of some
Clinton Board members, thus representing a wide range of Board
member ideologies. 10 5 Among its findings were that data showed many
employers wished to de-unionize and that many employers had made
proposals they knew were likely to lead to an impasse.0 6 This data thus
suggested that impasse was being used as a tool to de-unionize.I0 7 While
interesting, the data set is based on a skewed sample-only cases in
which the Board issued a decision. 108 As a result, it is impossible to
know how applicable the results are to negotiations and employers as a
whole.
Third, the authors have used a series of simulations to explore how
different methods for resolving bargaining impasses operate.' 09 The first
simulations examined three legal regimes for impasse resolution:
(A) At impasse the employer may implement its final offer; it may
permanently replace strikers; and it must bargain in good faith;

(B) At impasse the parties go to final offer binding arbitration (the law
in some states for the public sector); strikes and lockouts are illegal;
and

(C) To get beyond the impasse, the parties must reach agreement;

105. See Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7, at 207-10.
106.
107.

Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7, at 223-24, 226, 230.
Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7, at 229-30; Dannin & Wagar, Impasse and
Implementation,supra note 104

108.

Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7, at 205-07; Dannin & Wagar, How True,

supra note 104, at 5.
109. Gangaram Singh & Ellen Dannin, Law and Collective BargainingPower: An Experiment
to Test Labor Law Reform Proposals,in JUSTICE ON THE JOB: PERSPECTIVES ON THE EROSION OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 191, 193 (Richard N. Block ed., 2006)

[hereinafter Singh & Dannin, Collective Bargaining Power]; Ellen Dannin & Gangaram Singh,
Creating a Law Reform Laboratory: Empirical Research and Labor Law Reform, 51 WAYNE L.
REV. 1, 13 (2005) [hereinafter Dannin & Singh, Empirical Research]; Gangaram Singh & Ellen
Dannin, The Shadow of the Law: Impasse Laws at Odds with the NLRA, 53 LAB L.J. 179, 181

(2002) [hereinafter Singh & Dannin, Shadow of the Law].

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol25/iss1/4

18

Dannin
and Singh: More Than
Just A
Cool T-Shirt:
What We Don't Know About Collectiv
MAKING
ORGANIZING
EFFECTIVE
2007]
10
lockouts and strikes are legal; and no replacements are permitted.°

These simulations have provided a productive way to test theories
about how specific laws work.' The simulations so far have uncovered
clear differences on many dimensions 112among the three systems,
including the balance of bargaining power.
The authors are currently analyzing data from a second set of
simulations that examine six legal regimes in which one, two, or none of
the following methods for resolving impasse exist: implementation upon
impasse, permanent replacement of strikers, and temporary replacement
of strikers."13 A preliminary analysis of the data supports the conclusion
that existence or nonexistence of each of these impasse methods affects
perceptions of the parties' relative bargaining power and likelihood of
reaching agreement in unique ways. 14 The regime which offers both
permanent replacement of strikers and implementation upon impasse
was perceived as giving employers far more power
than employees and
15
of being the least likely to result in an agreement. 1
Taken together these simulation studies suggest that the law used to
resolve bargaining impasses has the power to cast a long shadow over
negotiations, negotiator strategy, and perceptions of power. More
specifically, employers were perceived as having the greatest bargaining
power in a regime in which both permanent striker replacement and
implementation upon impasse existed, while unions were perceived as
having the most power where neither existed. In addition, the first
regime was seen as one in which the parties were least likely to consider
the other side's proposal and the least likely to reach a negotiated
agreement. The second regime was seen as most likely for negotiators
to consider the other side's proposals and most likely to reach a
negotiated agreement. In other words, these findings suggest that the
existence of implementation upon impasse and striker replacement

110. Singh & Dannin, Shadow of the Law, supra note 109, at 180-81; Dannin & Singh,
Empirical Research, supra note 109, at 13-14; Singh & Dannin, Collective Bargaining Power,
supra note 109, at 193-96.
111. Singh & Dannin, Collective BargainingPower, supra note 109, at 209; Dannin & Singh,
EmpiricalResearch, supra note 109, at 47.
112. Singh & Dannin, Collective Bargaining Power, supra note 109, at 208-09; Dannin &
Singh, EmpiricalResearch, supra note 109, at 29; Singh & Dannin, Shadow of the Law, supra note
109, at 187.
113. See

Ellen Dannin,

Michelle Dean

& Gangaram

Singh, Law Reform,

Collective

Bargaining,and the Balance of Power, 11 WORKING USA (forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Dannin,
Dean & Singh, Balance of Power].
114. Id.
115.

Id.
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undermine the NLRA's policies and their absence promotes the policies.
In short, existing empirical research on implementation upon
impasse and its relationship with striker replacement is sparse and
unsystematic. But there is no reason for this state of affairs to continue.
Certainly, in this case, the misfortunate lack of research is potentially
some researcher's fortune. To promote that process, we set out a
systematic research agenda.
III. CRAFTING A RESEARCH AGENDA
It is rare for a scholarly article to be written about what is not
known about a subject, as opposed to what is known. That, however, is
the focus of this section. So far, what is known about the intersection of
implementation upon impasse and striker replacement suggests four
immediate areas for basic research: (1) documenting its incidence,
context, and frequency; (2) rigorously analyzing its characteristics,
including the impact of geography, industry, union, negotiator
preparation, labor-management cooperation programs, 116 the identity of
employer and union representatives, and the role of the NLRB in
resolving or promoting impasses and the use of the impasse weapons;
(3) ascertaining whether employers reach impasse as a strategy, and, if
so, what drives this strategy; (4) assessing its impact on the economy,
union density, and achieving the NLRA goals of improving employee
terms of employment and promoting co-determination of workplace
conditions. 7
The choice of an appropriate methodology is as important as
determining what questions are to be answered. The method of study
may not be a matter of choice. Researchers usually come out of school
with training in one research method, and that is the one they will use.
However, the menu of choices can be expanded by working with a
research partner from another discipline. In the best cases, this can lead
to growth and greater understanding in addition to the ability to do
important research neither can do alone. In the worst cases, a research
partner may be unreliable or the researchers will be unable to bridge
disciplinary differences.
116. In a small preliminary survey of union bargainers conducted by Dannin, Wagar, and
Gilson, one surprising result was that the existence of labor management cooperation programs was
positively related to reaching impasse. This test run had too small a sample to be meaningful, but it
does suggest that any survey should include questions about the role labor-management cooperation
plays in resolving bargaining issues.
117. See Dannin & Singh, EmpiricalResearch, supra note 109, at l l-12.
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If choice of research methods is possible, it is important not to
plunge ahead, but, rather, spend time thinking about the purpose of the
study. Is it to test or refine theories? Is it to investigate problems in
theories or in the fit of facts to theories? Is it to increase knowledge of
facts in order to make change in policies? Considering who the audience
is-theorists, other researchers, or policymakers-may assist in deciding
what the research goal is.
For legal academics that have never done empirical work, empirical
studies are both exciting and daunting. Trying to tease meaning out of a
table of statistics can feel like looking at a wall, but given time and
patience, it is possible to see the story told by the numbers. This job
cannot be left up to research partners, for while they may be good at
analyzing statistics, they will need to rely on the lawyer to explain the
nuances of the law, facts, and legal issues. The partner, in turn, can help
explain issues such as statistical significance and the distinction between
correlation versus causation. For lawyers, proof means something
different from scientific proof. It is important to bear in mind that
experiments can neither conclusively prove nor disprove theories. In
other words, results consistent with a theory's predictions do not
necessarily mean the theory is true. The results only mean that so far the
theory has not been falsified. In addition, data can seem so compelling
that it is tempting to give it more credence than is appropriate. This
means the investigator must question the validity and meaning of all
results, especially those that support one's thesis.
Studies tend to fall in one of two categories: (1) inductive, that is,
observations based on the examination of data in order to develop or test
a theory or proposition or (2) deductive, that is, reasoning from axioms
to develop theories and make predictions. No single method is best, and
the use of many methods has the benefit of providing a more robust
understanding of the object of study. Indeed, the discussion above on
impasse research to date showed that study of the issue of impasse has
already used many methodologies, and each has a contribution to
make. "'
Here, then, is a quick overview of issues involved with choosing a
research methodology.
A. MethodologicalChallenges
Considering the advantages of various methodologies is as
I 18.

See supra text accompanying notes 102-15.
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important as identifying issues to be explored.
1. Comparisons of Bargaining Contracts: It might seem that the
best way to gauge the impact of the impasse doctrines would be to
compare outcomes using collective bargaining agreements from
negotiations where an impasse was declared versus those where there
was no impasse. However, this is not a useful route for a number of
reasons.
Any impact of implementation upon impasse will not show up in
consummated agreements or, at best, could be discerned only weakly
and with enormous effort. First, one would have to compare the terms
of each agreement with a control group to determine the outcome that
would have been achieved under another bargaining regime.
Unfortunately, there is no systematic or comprehensive collection of
collective bargaining agreements. "The Bureau of Labor Statistics
collects only agreements covering more than 1000 workers, but most
negotiations take place in far smaller units," and these may be the
contexts in which the impasse weapons are used. 119
Second, and even worse, any study based on collective bargaining
agreements would not capture situations in which no agreement was
reached, in which the union was decertified, or in which the strikers
were replaced, the very situations in which the impact of the doctrine is
of most importance.
Third, even in negotiations where impasse is not declared, it is
always a concern at some level. Both employer and union negotiators
will be aware of the roles that the impasse doctrines can play.12 0 As a
result, vigilance for signs that impasse may be a tactic will affect even
negotiations where it is not even mentioned.
2. Case Studies: A more useful methodology "to gather basic data
on the incidence, characteristics, determinants, and impact of impasse"
would be case studies in which the investigator attended the negotiations
and observed the process.' 21 In our opinion, case studies have many
positive qualities. We have found that they are a well-accepted method
of research and one in which many social scientists are trained. They
provide a window into real events as they unfold. They capture complex
actions and interactions and cast light on natural behavior.

119.
120.
121.

Dannin & Singh, Empirical Research, supra note 109, at 9.
See id. at 12.
Id. at 7.
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However, case studies of collective bargaining, especially ones
involving implementation upon impasse and striker replacement, may.
require the commitment of years to just one negotiation.1 2' For example,
and
a study of NLRB cases involving implementation upon impasse
1 23
striker replacement found negotiations that lasted many years.
3. Surveys: We have long wanted to conduct a local or national
survey of employer and union negotiations. Surveys of real negotiations
could provide a window into how collective bargaining takes place
under the impasse doctrines. Depending on the design, it could pick up
data on a number of factors that theoretically affect bargaining processes
and outcomes. For example, in the mid-1990s, we observed that there
seemed to be a number of bad faith bargaining cases in the newspaper
industry.1 24 This observation suggested to us that a survey should
include questions about the role of industry associations in formulating
bargaining proposals.
We have so far been unsuccessful in our plan for a survey because
we were unsuccessful in securing the grant money necessary to support
the undertaking. A survey of the scope needed would be very
expensive. 121 We were told that the main reasons we were unsuccessful
in securing the grants were: 1) no one was doing research in this area so
it must not be important; and 2) examining collective bargaining
agreements for the impact of implementation upon impasse or striker
replacement was a better methodology. These responses are a warning
to others as to the difficulty of research that requires grants.
As for the second reason we were given for denial, the referee was
unaware of the problems with using collective bargaining agreementsin other words, a referee can have an impact on research that is not
warranted by their knowledge. We decided to do the basic research that
would demonstrate that this is an important and interesting area, which
led us to use bargaining simulations. 126 We found that they, too, require
grant money, mainly to pay the participants, but the cost was much less
than that of national surveys.
Surveys in an area as contested as collective bargaining will require
care in their construction. Certainly surveys can be constructed that
122.
123.
124.
N.L.R.B.
125.
126.

Id.
Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7, at 216 fig. 2.
See, e.g., Detroit News, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 262 (1995); McClatchy Newspapers, 299
1045 (1990), rev'd, 131 F.3d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Dannin & Singh, EmpiricalResearch, supranote 109, at 8.
See Dannin, Dean & Singh, Balance of Power, supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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require asking questions about emotional or even embarrassing issues.
In the case of impasse doctrine, it may mean asking whether the parties
have engaged in bad faith bargaining; in other words, whether they have
violated the law.
This means that any researcher must consider whether the time
invested in order to capture details of one negotiation is the best use of
the time and money required versus another methodology. One
alternative would be to use records kept by negotiators themselves.
However, records may suffer from a real or perceived bias. Another
option would be to use NLRB case files. They will include affidavits,
notes proposals, and other documents that can be analyzed. However,
these will all be negotiations in which bad faith bargaining was alleged,
so they will suffer from selection bias.
At some point, this technique or some variant of it should be tried,
but it should not be the only method. Both case studies and surveys are
likely to be very expensive and thus may require grant-writing skills to
fund them.
4. Simulations and Other Psychological Experiments: The
simulations research discussed above has the advantage of creating what
is essentially a law reform laboratory. That is, simulations make it
possible to test actual reactions to different methods for resolving
impasses and to do so in a way that is akin to that used to study the
physical sciences; simulations make it possible to decide upon a theory
or policy to test or an anomaly to explore. The impasse simulations
coupled with a survey instrument have made it possible to get detailed
information on conduct under different regimes as well as reactions by
the participants as to their views on their "laws." Even though these are
not the real world, they have enough points in common with it that they
provide rich feedback that researchers can build on in follow-up
simulations or through other methodologies.
Ideally a simulation should be as simple as possible. Simulations
used in game theory or experimental economics are often kept free of
context in order to test very simple theories. However, in some cases a
theory cannot be tested free from context. A simulation to test the
impasse doctrines is needed to provide context in order to educate naive
participants. As little context as possible should be used, for participants
may vary in how they interpret or understand context. This means that
context creates a possibility of bias.
Simulations make it possible to test policies in a way that can
illuminate weaknesses in theory and shed light on the possibility of
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outcomes or problems not considered by theory. They may suggest
issues that should be taken into consideration in drafting legislation or
implementing the law. Although there are drawbacks, realistic context
provides the opportunity for powerful insights to emerge during
simulations.
Another issue to consider is who is an appropriate simulation
participant. In some cases, professionals or people who know the field
can be ideal because they do not need to be trained in the nuances of law
and practical application. However, professionals may have biases that
they will apply to the issues being tested. Naive participants are more
likely to lack the strong biases of employer and union negotiators, but
they need to be trained about issues that matter if their responses are to
be realistic and therefore meaningful. Given the brief time available for
a simulation, care must be taken to ensure that training is complete and
accurate while being as succinct as possible. In our study, we chose to
use naive participants and to use them in two sets of simulations. 27
There was some overlap among issues, and outcomes as to the issues
were quite consistent. This consistency supports the validity of our
results.
One of the most useful things we did in constructing the study was
inadvertent. In the second study, we took notes during the debriefing at
the end of each session as we engaged in an open discussion of the
participants' reactions.
We also invited the participants to add
comments, based on that discussion, to a separate survey instrument.
These comments illuminated and helped explain the statistical results.
One caution about the use of simulations is that they are so much
fun and seem to reveal so much about real world operations that it is
important to do constant reality checks and to be cautious in the
interpretation of the data. Not every key issue can be tested directly.
For example, in the simulations, we wanted to test whether the
various iterations of implementation upon impasse and striker
replacement affected bargaining power. 2 8 However, the nature of the
simulation made it impossible to test this issue, because we only allowed
our participants to create their negotiation strategies. We did not allow
them to then bargain and measure outcomes, because naive negotiators
were unlikely to mirror those of experienced negotiators and thus the
results of their negotiations would tell us nothing useful about
bargaining power in real negotiations. We did, however, feel confident
127.
128.

See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

25

Hofstra Labor HOFSTRA
and Employment
Journal, Vol.LA25,
Iss. 1 [2007], Art.
4
LABOR Law
& EMPLOYMENT
WJOURNAL
[Vol.

25:93

that the structure of the simulation would tell us something about their
perceptions of their own and their opponent's bargaining power and that
the participants' perceptions of bargaining power were likely to reveal
something of actual bargaining power. This was especially likely to be
the case since we had a large number of participants for each regime;
thus trends in the data were likely to be reliable.
In short, although the structure of this simulation did not allow us to
measure bargaining power related to each regime, it did allow us to test
whether an impasse method affected perceptions of relative party
bargaining power and that we could draw some useful conclusions that
these perceptions told us about real world bargaining power which
would affect actual bargaining outcomes. 129 The result is that we are
using simulations to illuminate forces and help fill in our knowledge
about processes.
If care is taken about the limitations of simulations, they are a
useful tool that gives a researcher a high degree of control over factors to
be studied. They make it possible to replicate and verify findings. They
can be used to falsify theories; that is, if predicted results do not appear
in the experiment, they probably will not appear in the real world. They
can help to answer research and policy questions. But, again, they only
suggest what might happen in the real world and cannot predict what
will happen.
Simulations and other research that involves the use of human
beings requires compliance with regulations on the use of human
subjects in research, just as it does for survey research and psychological
experiments.
Simulations also entail detailed experimental logistics, beyond just
running the simulation. They require being able to recruit an appropriate
and adequate pool of participants, possibly providing compensation for
participation, and potentially debriefing about the purpose and design of
the experiment. Simulations must also be carefully designed, so some
test runs are important, as are test data analyses to ensure that the model
is appropriate and that survey instrument questions are unambiguous and
appropriate for eliciting the information desired.
5. Doctrinal / Historical: The forms of study that will be most
129. See id. at 208-09. See generally Ellen Dannin & Gangaram Singh, The Force of Law on
Collective Bargaining: Empirical Research and Labor Law Reform 1, 32-33 (2002) (unpublished

article, on file with author), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=433480 (describing the
methodology of simulations performed by the author, analysis of data gathered therein, and
proposals for change that resulted).
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comfortable to legal researchers are doctrinal and historical. They can
provide an understanding of how the law evolved that reveals the
existence of underlying policies. In the case of the impasse doctrines,
the history of striker replacement is relatively well known, while the
history of implementation upon impasse was less so until recently.
More can certainly be learned by examining the forces that led to the
evolution of legal doctrines that undermine the statutes they are grafted
onto. In some cases, historical studies can be a form of comparative law.
6. Comparative Law: Comparative law can be an attractive vehicle
to provide insight into domestic law. Researchers in the United States
have found Canadian law to be a source of law reform proposals, as well
as a source of evidence of how different iterations of law have
functioned in a similar country.! 30 In the case of the impasse doctrines,
New Zealand has also been used as a law reform laboratory in order to
examine how proposed reforms have operated or how social context
affects laws that appear similar. 13 1 When using legal developments in
another country as a source of information, data can be gathered from
observation, interviews, or records of events, such as news stories or
legal cases.
There are important caveats in the case of comparative work. First,
as in almost no other area of research, it is easy to do mediocre, nonrigorous work. This is most likely to be done if research has no more
depth than comparing statutes or case outcomes. In order to do
meaningful comparative work, a researcher must be fully immersed in
the foreign society. This takes time and work to see the other country as
its natives do.
Second, it is lucky when natural experiments occur, but this sort of
luck is rare. To find useful natural experiments, a researcher needs both
luck and curiosity. A researcher also needs caution and circumspection
in order not to read too much into seemingly similar or dissimilar
developments.
7. Content Analyses: Content analyses of documents such as laws
or cases can provide useful information akin to that of a survey. An
analysis of cases can provide a wealth of data including basic
130. See Richard N. Block, Rethinking the National Labor Relations Act and Zero-Sum Labor
Law: An Industrial Relations View, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP & LAB. L. 30, 43-50 (1997).
131. See Ellen Dannin & Clive Gilson, Getting to Impasse: Negotiations Under the National
Labor Relations Act and the Employment ContractsAct, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 917, 918
(1996).
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demographics concerning parties, dates, violations charged, industries,
geographic areas, decision-makers, and attorneys. Depending on the
object of study, it may be possible to focus on language used in order to
discern motives. Content analysis can feel a bit like an archeological
excavation, peeling back what lies beneath the surface.
While a legal researcher should have no trouble reading the cases
and identifying the facts that are the focus of study, it may be necessary
to work with and learn from partners in other disciplines. If there is a
large data set, statistical analysis will be required in order to make useful
sense of the information.
Gathering data through content analysis is time consuming and
tedious. Student assistants can be used, but not many will find this to be
exciting work. Care must be taken to check their results, and cases may
need to be analyzed by more than one person to ensure that issues which
require judgment calls are coded consistently. Furthermore, information
that finds its way into published cases is not a fair representation of
reality or of all legal disputes in an area. This creates problems of
selection bias and skewed data.
In sum, there are many methodologies available to study legal
doctrines. In the next sections, we discuss the substance of research to
which these methodologies can be applied.
B. Impasse-Incidence
We know that not all employers use impasse strategically and that,
of those who do, not all use it to undermine collective bargaining, for, if
they did, no one would ever agree to a new contract and collective
bargaining would be a long dead institution. However, we do know that
at least some employers do pursue strategic impasses. 132 In a collective
bargaining regime that resolves impasses by allowing an employer to
unilaterally implement its terms and that offers an employer the
opportunity to rid itself of a unionized workforce should they strike, we
would expect to see it used strategically in at least some cases. The data
and anecdotal evidence support these two conclusions so far.
Unfortunately, to date no study has addressed the specific question of
incidence, so we cannot answer the most fundamental question: How
common is it? We also do not know whether the incidence of
implementation upon impasse and striker replacement vary based on
132. See generally Peter G. Earle, Note, The Impasse Doctrine, 64 CHI. KENT L. REV. 407
passim (1988) (tracing the history, definition, and application of the impasse doctrine).
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industry, union, negotiator, job classification, and geography.
General experience gives some reason to suspect that its use may be
increasing, but there has been no good quantitative study. A rough study
based on the Lexis BNA Daily Labor Reporter file and the NLRB case
file found that implementation upon impasse cases roughly doubled,
while striker replacement cases remained flat during the period 19811995.133 Among the questions to be answered are: Do these figures and
trends in the database reflect the reality of negotiations? What is causing
these results?
While gathering this basic descriptive data is essential, much more
is needed in order to grasp whether these doctrines play a significant role
in collective bargaining. To answer that question, we need more
qualitative data to shed light on the quantitative data.
C. Characteristics
In order to assess the significance of the impasse doctrines, we need
information on the characteristics of bargaining in which it occurs versus
those in which it does not. If some impasses are strategic, what is
unique about the behavior of an employer who wishes to reach impasse?
The most direct way to answer this question might be to survey
employers, but since this could mean admitting to a violation of the law,
would they be candid? 3 4 If they are not candid, is it possible they
might, nonetheless, provide useful information or even inadvertently
reveal their purpose?
If direct evidence is not available or reliable, circumstantial
evidence might be useful in answering the question. Evidence of a
desire or attempts to reach impasse might be found in statements about
bargaining, impasse, or unions.1 35 Intent to reach an impasse might also
be evident in length of bargaining and number of bargaining sessions
before an employer declares an impasse. 136 However, strategic impasse
cases might involve few or many sessions and shorter or longer periods
as a result of a number of factors.13 v These might include whether

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Dannin, Legislative Intent, supra note 35, at 29-30.
Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supranote 7, at 220.
Seeid. at224.
Seeid. at213-15.
See Dannin, Collective Bargaining,supra note 35, at 55-56. These factors are the same as

those that the NLRB developed in order to determine whether a bargaining impasse was genuine.
See id. at 44. In the 1980s the Board began to loosen the requirements and thus make it possible to

achieve an impasse and implement more easily.

See id. at 42.
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surface bargaining is involved or whether a union was pursuing a
strategy of making small concessions or using information requests to
delay impasse.'
Thus, although length of bargaining and number of
meetings are important
factors, it seems likely that no one pattern is tied
139
to strategic impasses.
Concessions should tell us something about the negotiations. It
may be that unions would make different sorts of concessions if they are
trying to stave off what is or appears to be an impasse strategy versus the
normal course of bargaining. Normal concessions ought to demonstrate
a desire to promote the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes or
remove industrial strife and unrest. Concessions involving minor issues
might be more common when the goal is to delay impasse. Union
negotiators could be asked why concessions were made. Any survey or
case study must examine the depth, nature and purpose of concessionsnot just whether they were made. If there is a difference in types of
concessions, are those used to prevent impasse or implementation
successful in that role, do they achieve any other union goal, and what is
the impact on the employer-union relationship and the relationship of the
union with its members?
Unions may make information requests in order to delay or prevent
impasse and even permanent replacement of strikers. 140 If an employer
fails to provide information or to provide it in a timely manner, an
impasse might not be a bona fide impasse. 141 In addition, if the failure to
provide information is an unfair labor practice, and the union strikes in
response to it, the strikers may not be replaced permanently.142 More
achieved and the employer implements its offer, any strike may be an unfair labor practice strike,
preventing an employer from permanently replacing the strikers. See id. at 61. This means that
employers may be reacting to the needs of bargaining or they may be engaging in strategies to
persuade the NLRB that an impasse is bona fide. See id. at 63-64.
138. See Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7, at 204.

139. See id. at 214, 216. It might seem likely that an employer that is seeking to achieve a
strategic impasse might declare an impasse as quickly as possible Id. at 214. However, one study
found a mixed pattern. Id. Impasse was declared in 25% of cases with five or fewer meetings and
in 5% of cases with no meetings. Id. Thirty-six percent of cases involved bargaining of under three
months, and 14% involved bargaining of less than one month. Id. at 216. Without more, however,
these figures are opaque. Id. For example, an employer seeking to de-unionize might decide to
engage in extended bargaining to wear the union down. See id. On the other hand, few sessions or
an impasse achieved quickly might mean there was a deep and genuine divide coupled with the
need for swift action to save a company. See id. Obviously, time alone reveals little about the
employer's intent. See id. at 214, 216.
140. See Clifford R. Oviatt, Jr., The Bush NLRB in Perspective: Does the Playing Field Need
Leveling?, II HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 47, 60 (1993).
141. Dannin, Collective Bargaining,supra note 35, at 54.
142. Id. at 61.
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research is needed to know whether and how unions are using
information requests, what role this strategy plays in whether impasse is
reached, whether it prevents implementation or permanent replacement,
and whether these effects occur with or without filing Board charges.
D. Determinantsof Impasse
The NLRA promotes the co-determination of working conditions in
order to defuse labor unrest and improve working conditions. 143 But if
co-determination is reduced to nothing more than a compelled signature
on an agreement, then it is more akin to a coerced confession in criminal
law than the NLRA's goals of the "friendly adjustment of industrial
disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working
conditions, and . . .[the restoration of] equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees." 144
A key inquiry must be: what role, if any, does the employer's
ability to implement or hire permanent striker replacements play in
shaping bargaining and driving its outcomes? The mere fact that a
collective bargaining agreement was consummated does not mean
implementation upon impasse played no role. 145 A union (that fears an
employer may implement) facing an employer (that knows it can
implement) should be more likely to accede to an employer's bargaining
demands. The question, then, is: what would have happened under a
bargaining regime in which the union could have struck without fear of
replacement, the employer could not have implemented its final offer,
and "impasse" was a mere description rather than a goal that triggered a
reward? If the doctrine has a negative effect on union bargaining power,
it might help explain why, as many have noted, wage pressure was so
low through years of high productivity and low unemployment. 146
Teasing out the causes of impasse is not easy. Some impasses may
have been manufactured by an employer solely in order to implement, in
order to de-unionize, or for some other strategic purpose. 147 However,
some-and likely most-impasses will occur because the parties simply
disagree and have not yet found a way past that disagreement. How then

143. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
144. Id.
145. See Dannin, Collective Bargaining,supra note 37, at 66.
146. See, e.g., CENTURY FOUNDATION TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF UNIONS, WHAT'S
NEXT FOR ORGANIZED LABOR? 3-23 (1999).
147. DAVID A. DILTS & WILLIAM J. WALSH, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND IMPASSE
RESOLUTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 47-48 (1988).
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should a strategic impasse be distinguished from a normal impasse?
One way to distinguish between the two types of impasse would be
to examine the issue or issues which led to impasse. Most real
disagreements will arise because of economic reasons. If impasse is
reached on issues of less importance to an employer's bottom line, but
which an employer knows a union is unlikely to agree to, it seems
reasonable to suspect that the impasse was reached as part of the
employer's strategy. 49 Such an investigation should focus on impasses
that involve union security, dues checkoff, seniority, merit pay, certain
subcontracting issues, changing the scope of the bargaining unit,
changing job classifications, and other issues that take away the union's
ability to affect terms and conditions of employment. While these are
life or death issues to unions and workers, we would expect employers
to be more concerned with running the business-that is, with
economics-than dues checkoff. We would expect that even an
employer who was concerned with these issues would be unlikely to
reach impasse on them and endure the resulting disruption, unless
reaching impasse was the goal.
The problem is more complex, however, than economic versus
noneconomic issues. An impasse can still be strategic in nature, even
though it occurs as a result of economic issues."O In addition, impasses

148. Id. at 48. "When such an impasse is observed, it should be recognized for what it is: an
element of a bargaining strategy designed to accomplish some goal." Id.
149. In one study economic issues were the cause of impasse in only 37% of cases, while 50%
of impasses were caused by "control issues," issues that essentially allow an employer to control a
workplace or otherwise act as if no union were there. Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7,
at 223 tbI.5. Most likely no union will agree to control issues, thus ensuring an impasse. Cf NLRB
v. A-I King Size Sandwiches, Inc., 732 F.2d 872, 874-78 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding surface
bargaining where employer refused to relinquish any control whatsoever). Finding so many
impasses reached on control issues rather than economic issues in this study suggests that reaching
impasse was the goal. While it is not illegal to insist to impasse on control issues that are defined as
mandatory subjects of bargaining, some are permissive subjects upon which no legal impasse can be
reached. In addition, it is worth considering whether these are the sorts of issues that an employer
who abides by the law and recognizes a union as the legitimate representative of its workers should
be willing to compromise or at least take a hands-off attitude to. A traditional factor for
determining whether an impasse has been reached is the importance of the issue or issues upon
which impasse was reached. Peter Guyon Earle, Note, The Impasse Doctrine, 64 CHI. KENT L.
REv. 407,421 (1988) (citing Taft Broad. Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475,478 (1967)). While it is not illegal
to take a strong stand on most of these issues, arguably reaching an impasse on control issues would
be evidence that no real impasse had been reached. In addition, taking a stand might be evidence of
an intent to reach impasse.
150. Employers can also advance economic offers they know will be unacceptable to a union
and which are likely to cause an impasse, for example, demands for deep concessions by a
profitable employer. See Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7, at 202. In fact, this is an
employer's best strategy, because if the union strikes over economic issues, the employer may
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based on certain economic issues in specific contexts, specifically,
financial
demands for deep wage and benefit concessions unjustified by
52
circumstances,1 51 seem likely to be strategic rather than real. 1
Another factor that should be explored is what motivated an
employer to pursue an impasse strategy. Even an employer who had a
long term amicable collective bargaining relationship might choose
strategic impasse as a result of financial exigency, while others will
choose to enlist the union's help in working out financial problems. The
employer in financial trouble might be more willing to see the union as
an impediment to quick changes, many of which it knows will be
unpalatable to the employees.
Change of ownership or management might also motivate a change
in strategy. 15 3 Thus, the outer form of the employer might remain the

permanently replace the strikers. See id. Beginning in the 1980s, the Board forbade examining a
party's proposals for evidence of illegal intent. As a result, employers have had wide ambit to make
economic proposals likely to lead to impasse but yet not violate the law. See Okla. Fixture Co., 331
N.L.R.B. 1116, 1117 (2000). In Okla. Fixture Co., Member Hurtgen cautioned against evaluating
the reasonableness of a proposal but was willing to consider whether a proposal was designed to
frustrate bargaining and agreement. Id. at 1117 n. 10. See also Liquor Indus. Bargaining Group, 333
N.L.R.B. 1219, 1220 (2001); Reichhold Chems., Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 69, 69 (1988), aff'd in relevant
partsub noma. Teamsters Local Union No. 515 v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 719, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Board
examines proposals only to evaluate whether they are clearly to frustrate agreement). More
recently, the Board has retreated from this position. In Pub. Serv. Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 487 (2001),
the Board said it does not evaluate whether particular proposals are acceptable or unacceptable but
will infer bad-faith bargaining "when the employer's proposals, taken as a whole, would leave the
union and the employees it represents with substantially fewer rights and less protection than
provided by law without a contract" and where "the union is excluded from the participation in the
collective-bargaining process to which it is statutorily entitled, effectively stripping it of any
meaningful method of representing its members in decisions affecting important conditions of
employment..I.. Id. at 487-88.
151. For example, in Unbelievable, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., the employer proposed cutting some
wages 50%, essentially eliminating holiday and vacation pay, and eliminating the pension plan. 118
F.3d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1997). When the Operating Engineers union responded that the proposals
were so outlandish no union could agree to them, the employer responded that it would not mind if
the union struck. Id. By the third bargaining session, the employer declared impasse and said it
would implement its final offer. Id. In negotiations with the Teamsters, the employer proposed
discharge language which, according to the employer, meant it could fire "anybody for anything."
Id. The employer said it wanted a strike so it could replace the employees and get rid of the unions.
Id.; see also Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and FirstContract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF
AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75, 86 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds, 1994).
152. See, e.g., PETER RACHLEFF, HARD-PRESSED IN THE HEARTLAND: THE HORMEL STRIKE
AND THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT 115 (1993). In 1985, Hormel made its first and only
contract offer, one month before expiration. Id. The offer included a 150 page rewrite of the entire
agreement with no commitment to existing "safety problems" and a variety of other unrealistic
conditions. Id.
153. Cf Adrienne Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Collective Bargaining in the Paper Industry:
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same, but not its ethos. 154 Gathering the data about changes in
ownership or management and whether this entails a change in
philosophy may be difficult. Union informants might be able to provide
some of this information, but may also be unaware of changes or might
not know a new owner's philosophy. Alternate sources of information
might be surveying management respondents or examining a new
owner's record elsewhere. The behavior of new foreign owners,
particularly ones from countries with laws that promote collective
bargaining or where unions and employers have more amicable
relations, bears special attention. 155 How do these owners adapt to US
labor laws and mores?
A third factor that can motivate an employer to engage in a strategic
impasse is advice from a consultant or attorney. 15 6 Some studies have
suggested that management consultants counsel the use of strategies,
including illegal strategies, designed to undermine employees' choice of
collective bargaining. 157 Consultants can also play a role during
negotiations. Anecdotal evidence supports the contention that employer
consultants advise strategic implementation even though this would
violate the law. Penalties for NLRA violations are small, and the
benefits can be great. 158 Unions may be unaware that a consultant is
involved, because they often try to operate behind the scenes.159 Where
the identity of a consultant is known, it may be possible to discover its
Developments Since 1979, in CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
25, 54 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1994); see also Charles Craypo, Meatpacking: Industry Restructuring
and Union Decline, in CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 63, 8889 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1994).
154. See Michelle Amber, NLRB Approves Settlement Agreement Ending Litigation Between
Avondale, Unions, available at LEXIS 244 DLR A-I 2, Dec. 21, 2001 (case demonstrating that new

ownership can also convert an embattled relationship into an amicable one).
155. See Gregory M. Saltzman, Job Applicant Screening by a Japanese Transplant:A UnionAvoidance Tactic, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 88, 90 (1995-1996).
156. See Jules Bernstein, The Evolution of the Use of Management Consultants in Labor
Relations: A Labor Perspective, 36 LAB. L.J. 292, 296 (1985); Terry A. Bethel, Profitingfrom
Unfair Labor Practices:A Proposalto Regulate Management Representatives, 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
506, 507 (1984); Michael H. LeRoy, Severance of Bargaining Relationships During Permanent
Replacement Strikes and Union Decertifications: An Empirical Analysis and Proposalto Amend
Section 9(c)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1019, 1052, 1073, 1075-76 (1996).
157. See Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and FirstContract Campaigns,in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75, 83-84 (Sheldon
Friedman et al. eds., 1994); MARTIN J. LEVITT WITH TERRY CONROW, CONFESSIONS OF A UNION
BUSTER 151 (1993).
158. PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 234-35 (1990).
159. See MARTIN J. LEVITT WITH TERRY CONROW, CONFESSIONS OF A UNION BUSTER 42

(1993).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol25/iss1/4

34

Dannin
and Singh: More Than
Just ORGANIZING
A Cool T-Shirt:
What We Don't Know About Collectiv
MAKING
EFFECTIVE
20071

record using resources unions have constructed to share information
about them. 6 ' Employers would then have information as to how
consultants are used.
An investigation could determine whether certain industries
experience greater levels of impasse and implementation. Any that do
could then be the subject of follow-up investigations to determine what
factors might have caused this result. One factor could be changing
technology. Financial exigency could exist within a specific industry
even though the larger economy is healthy, and if so, it might drive all
members of that industry to pursue independent impasse strategies, or it
might drive express industry policy. While in some cases documents
might provide this information, much of this may be considered
confidential or be difficult to find. If the same terms are sought within
individual negotiations this might be some evidence for the existence of
such a strategy.
The use of labor-management cooperation should also be
investigated as a factor that might affect impasse and particularly the use
of an impasse strategy. If labor-management cooperation is used to
improve problem solving, then the existence of such a program would
make implementation upon impasse less likely. However, the reality
may be more complex and more interesting. At a minimum, an
impasse-particularly if it is accompanied by implementation-reached
by an employer engaged in labor-management cooperation will call into
question its effectiveness in defusing workplace tensions. This would be
even more the case if the union is decertified. Given the repeated
attempts to amend the NLRA to permit forms of labor-management
cooperation which are currently illegal as assisted or dominated labor
organizations, 16' a finding that it does not defuse workplace problems,
and thus, may not improve productivity, would be important for national
policy.
It is worth noting that some have theorized that labor-management
cooperation can be used to de-unionize by offering cooperation as a
substitute for unionization. 62 If true, then an employer might pair it

160. For example, unions have created websites to track consultants. See, e.g., Spotlight on
Union Busters, http://www.corporatecampaign.org/laily.htm (last visited Dec. 3 2007); Welcome to
the Bust the Union Buster Website, http://www.aflcio.org/unionbuster/ (last visited Dec. 3 2007).
161. See, e.g., Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1997, H.R. 634, 105th Cong.
(1997).
162. TERRY L. BESSER, TEAM TOYOTA: TRANSPLANTING THE TOYOTA CULTURE TO THE
CAMRY PLANT IN KENTUCKY 16-17 (1996); GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, INHUMAN RELATIONS:
QUALITY CIRCLES AND ANTI-UNIONISM IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 177 (1988); James Rundle,
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with a de-unionizing strategy, including using the impasse doctrines. In
order to determine this, it would be important to know not only if labormanagement cooperation exists in a workplace but also details of its
operation. For example, excluding the union from its institution and
operation would suggest that the employer is pursuing a union
substitution strategy, 163
and that an impasse was reached because of a
64
desire to de-unionize.'
It seems likely that employer anti-union sentiment would play a
role in de-unionization.
However, many employers probably
consummate collective bargaining agreements each year and do not use
their power to implement strategically, despite not liking unions. Given
that many employers harbor some degree of anti-union attitudes or at
least would like to gain unilateral control of the employment
relationship, 165 it seems likely that most employers would be tempted to
at least consider a strategy of intended or calculated impasse.1 66 It also
appears that, whatever an employer's sentiments, the doctrine of
implementation on impasse ought to help shape employer attitudes in
favor of an impasse strategy. When the option to implement on impasse
is available what, then, makes an employer decide an impasse strategy is
not to its advantage?
A good labor climate should make an employer less likely to try to
pursue an impasse strategy, but such a climate may be the result of other
factors as much as it might drive them. Assessing their interaction
would entail a two-step process: first, examining the incidence of
impasse associated with each of these factors; and second, further
exploration to understand the dynamics, particularly where there are
unexpected correlations. Thus, factors such as job classifications,

Winning Hearts and Minds in the Era of Employee-Involvement Programs, in ORGANIZING TO WIN:

NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 213, 215 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et. al. eds., 1998); James R.
Rundle, The Debate over the Ban on Employer-Dominated Labor Organizations: What is the
Evidence?, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds.,

1994).
163. See Bruce Nissen, Unions and Workplace Reorganization, in UNIONS AND WORKPLACE
REORGANIZATION 9, 12 (Bruce Nissen ed., 1997).

164. See Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7, at 226. One study found that
approximately 39% of employers in the study demonstrated a strong desire to de-unionize. Id. at
226 tbl.6.
165. See Morris M. Kleiner, Intensity of Management Resistance: Understandingthe Decline
of Unionization in the Private Sector, 22 J. LAB. RES. 519, 522 (2001); Cynthia L. Estlund,
Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: Misunderstandingthe National Labor Relations Act,
71 TEx. L. REV. 921, 948-52 (1993).
166. DAVID A. DILTS & WILLIAM J. WALSH, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND IMPASSE
RESOLUTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 48 (1988).
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industry, geography, industry association policy and recommendations,
or the union involved may have an impact on an employer's decision to
For example, certain job
use or not use impasse strategically.
classifications may have sufficiently great bargaining power to force the
employer to bargain, while others would not. Conditions in some
industries may make an employer fear losing productive time to a
workplace dispute, while a declining industry may push employers to cut
costs ruthlessly.
The length of the relationship between the employer and the union
may be a key issue to determine whether impasse is being used
strategically. Although many have been concerned about the problem of
achieving first contracts after winning an NLRB election,
implementation upon impasse has occurred in very long term
relationships, some as many as seventy-five years. 16 Because older
relationships exist only where there are companies of long standing,
many of these relationships could be in industries suffering from the
restructuring and global competition of recent years. 168 This would
make it more likely that these older companies would have strong
incentives to seek economic relief. 169 On the other hand, just because
these motives could exist, does not mean they do. Just as plausible is
that a change in management has occurred 70or that existing management
has decided to pursue a change in strategy. 1
Geography may also play a complex role. Employers in a specific
region are more likely to share information or to be aware of local
bargaining disputes and their details. They may also use the same
attorneys or other representatives and receive similar advice regarding
bargaining. In addition, employers in a specific region, regardless of
industry, may be affected by similar economic conditions. Furthermore,
different areas of the country may have different mores and find
different bargaining behavior acceptable. The dividing line between

167.

See Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7, at 210. It was also unexpected that

implementation in the cases involving older relationships were particularly devastating. See id. at
211. The Board has been far less likely to find an impasse to be illegal the longer the relationship

exists. Id. A track record of prior agreements is a valid reason to interpret ambiguous evidence in
favor of a real impasse. Id. at 211-12. Thus, where there has been long term collective bargaining,
the Board may resolve doubtful evidence more favorably to the employer because the Board

presumes those employers are not anti-union. See id. However, if there has been a change in
management or ownership the new management may have decided to take a different approach to
labor-management relations, including seeking a strategic impasse. See id. at 213.
168. Id.at210-11.
169. Id. at 212-13.
170. Id. at 213.
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right-to-work states versus non-right-to-work states is an obvious one,
but there may also be relevant differences within each of these large
groups. One such difference might be comparative state levels of
unionization or, within a state, the interplay between rural and urban
views.
Finally, the impact of specific unions needs to be considered. For
example, Justice for Janitors has pursued coordinated tactics throughout
the country that have enhanced their bargaining success and achieved far
better results than would have been predicted based on their members'
skills, citizenship status, and job mobility."'7 Teamster strategies during
the UPS strike involved carefully executed plans which began a year
before the contract was to expire and which made it impossible for the
employer to pursue an aggressive strategy. 172 However, while Justice
for Janitors has replicated its strategy nationwide,
the Teamsters do not
73
appear to have done so with the UPS strategy. 1
Some unions have been proactive in creating strategies and
promoting negotiator training to resist impasse. 174 Some have been more
involved in researching the employer prior to bargaining, and developing
a strike-avoidance strategy 175 before negotiations begin. 176 If unions
have developed ways to respond to the possibility of impasse, how
effective are these?
E. Impact ofReaching Impasse
Many factors used to assess whether an impasse was strategic may
also reveal and predict the impacts of impasse. A union's filing a charge
concerning an employer's declaration of impasse and implementationand, particularly, the NLRB's finding that an impasse was not bona fide
171. Roger Waldinger, et al., Helots No More: A Case Study of the Justice for Janitors
Campaign in Los Angeles, in ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 102
(Kate Bronfenbrenner, et al., eds. 1998; Ruben J. Garcia, Across the Borders: Immigrant Status and
Identity in Law and LatCrit Theory, 55 FLA. L. REv. 511, 528-29 (2003).
172. See Stephen B. Moldof, Union Responses to the Challenges ofan Increasingly Globalized
Economy, 5 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 119, 133 (2005).
173. Compare Brian Petruska, Choosing Competition: A Proposalto Modify Article XX of the
AFL-CIO Constitution, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 12-13 (2003), and Herbert R. Northrup,
The Teamsters' Union Attempt To Organize Overnite Transportation Company: A Study of a Major
Union Failure, 30 TRANSP. L.J. 127 (2003) (discussing the Teamsters' organizing and union
strategies), with Moldof, supra note 172, at 133 (discussing UPS's 1997 strategy).
174. See Dannin, Lawless Law, supra note 7, at 216-17.
175. See James J. Brudney, To Strike orNot to Strike, 1999 WIS L. REv. 65, 82-83.
176. For example, some unions have used information requests as a tactic to stave off a finding
of a bona fide impasse. See Dannin, LegislativeIntent, supra note 35, at 29.
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and that an implementation was illegal may suggest that impasse was
pursued as a strategy, but would certainly not be determinative. Board
trial and investigatory files contain useful information. A union may file
a charge for many reasons: because it believes there is an unfair labor
practice, to achieve some strategic goal such as ensuring that a strike
will be found to be an unfair labor practice strike as opposed to an
economic strike,'77 to rally the troops, or to pressure an employer to
settle a contract. 178 In addition to knowing the outcome of a charge
(whether it was dismissed, a complaint was issued, or it settled) the
Board's assessment of evidence would be useful. Filing the charge
might ameliorate the bargaining situation. This would provide insights
into the Board's performance in both its formal processes and in its
wider role in promoting collective bargaining.
We do not know the incidence of de-unionization after an impasse
and whether it only occurs where an impasse was strategic.
Finally, the employer's ability to replace strikers is seen by many as
weakening union bargaining power. 7 9 Strikes naturally tend to occur
when there is an impasse in bargaining. As a consequence, striker
replacement and implementation upon impasse have both a temporal
connection and, theoretically, a tendency to operate in the same
direction-to weaken union bargaining power. Unions fear strikes as a
risky strategy that could lead to de-unionization. They also fear reaching
an impasse-both because it might lead to a strike and de-unionization
and also because it would allow an employer to implement terms of
employment. In either case, the unions know that they may become
powerless to affect employees' terms and conditions of employment, and
thus moribund, as a result of impasse. This complex interplay leads to
the question of how to assess an employer's motives from the fact that a

177. An employer is not permitted to hire permanent replacements ifa strike was caused by the
employer's unfair labor practices and this fact, along with the reality that the determination of

whether a strike is an economic or an unfair labor practice strike does not come until relatively late;
therefore, a mistaken prediction can be costly and may push the parties toward a settlement.
Michael D. Moberly, Striking a Happy Medium: The Conversion of Unfair Labor Practice Strikes
to Economic Strikes, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131, 139-43 (2001); Douglas E. Ray, Some
Overlooked Aspects of the Strike Replacement Issue, 41 U. KAN. L. REv. 363, 368, 373 (1992).
178. See Ray, supra note 177, at 370-71, 399-400.
179. As discussed above, implementation upon impasse is likely to be accompanied by striker
replacement. See Dannin & Wagar, Lawless Law, supra note 7, at 202-03. Unions have been

advised to avoid strikes for fear of permanent replacement, so it seemed likely there would be
relatively few strikes; however, strikes occurred in 144 of 228 cases, or in 63.6% of cases. Id. at
217. Permanent replacements were hired in 67 cases or in 46.5% of the strikes. Id. If impasse is

being used with permanent replacement of strikers to de-unionize, this level of strikes and
replacements suggests that an environment to accomplish that end did exist. See id. at 202.
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strike has occurred.
IV. CONCLUSION

If it is correct that the doctrines of implementation upon impasse
and striker replacement operate in tandem to strengthen employer
bargaining power and to weaken unions and if, in addition, they offer
employers a method of de-unionizing, essentially giving them veto
power over a choice the law says belongs to employees, then we need to
ask whether these doctrines should continue to exist. Moreover, if these
doctrines determine whether or not employees can use bargaining to codetermine their work lives, then studying them has the potential to add to
our understanding of the economy and the ways in which law shapes
behavior. A research agenda targeted toward finding answers to the
sorts of questions sketched above would begin the process of
understanding to what extent implementation upon impasse is used, how
it is used, and what impact it has. The responses should also amplify
existing bargaining theory and help explain otherwise anomalous
phenomena, including wage stagnation despite low unemployment and
the continued drop in union membership despite heroic efforts by unions
to increase their numbers.
If, in addition, empirical research shows that implementation on
impasse favors the employer to such an extent that it undercuts
collective bargaining, weakens unions, and leads to de-unionization then
it tells us we need legal reform to enable the NLRA to achieve its
purpose. These are issues of critical importance to the survival of
unions. The research required to answer these questions is enormous.
We invite our colleagues in all disciplines to join us in this scholarly
enterprise.
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